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Abstract 
The need for light-weight cryptographic algorithms has been increasing in recent times 
with the birth of RFID-enabled Internet of Things (IoT). The main challenge everyone faces when 
designing security protocols for RFID systems is the resource constrained environment in which 
these cryptographic algorithms have to be deployed. These resources include the limited memory 
and processing capabilities, limited power supply and short range of operation. The higher the 
memory offered, the costlier the system gets. Traditional cryptographic algorithms developed so 
far are rendered useless in such an environment and new algorithms have to be developed from 
scratch keeping in mind the limited resources available.  
Many such security protocols have been proposed which often assume that a hash function 
is present inside the RFID-tag. These hash algorithms form an additional overhead to the 
processing and hence several low cost functions have been researched. Two of such functions are 
PHOTON and SPONGENT which were primarily hardware oriented designs based on the 
hermetic sponge construction. The present work involves implementation of these two hardware 
designs in software to be deployed on to the RFID tags and analyzing these implementations. 
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Chapter 
Introduction 
1.1 RFID Systems 
Communication in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems occurs through radio 
waves in order to identify objects/persons automatically. Readers and tags are the main parts of an 
RFID System. Readers send queries to tags in their particular transmission ranges for some data 
contained in the tags and tags reply with the queried information such as identification (ID) 
numbers.  
RFID tags are constrained devices in terms of storage and computing capability. Some tags 
don’t even have their own power source. They are instead powered wirelessly by the readers.  
Tags can be divided based on: 
 Their operating frequency: low, high and ultra-high.  
 Power source: passive and active.   
 Processing ability: there are tags with a limited amount of processing and storage 
and tags without any ICs (called chip-less tags) 
Passive tags use the radio energy transmitted by the reader whereas active tags have their 
own power source and transmitters. Most RFID systems utilize one of three general bands:  
 Low Frequency (LF) i.e., 125 kHz to 134 kHz 
  High Frequency (HF) i.e., 13.56 MHz 
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 Ultra High Frequency (UHF) i.e., 860 to 930 MHz 
Any RFID tag contains at least the following components:  
1. An IC for processing and modulation/demodulation of signals 
2. An antenna for communication purposes 
The basic setup of any RFID system is as shown below.  
Figure 1 A typical RFID System 
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Every tag has a unique code for identification. In a passive tag environment, the RFID 
reader generates a low-level radio frequency magnetic field that works as a power source for the 
tag. The tag responds to the reader’s query and broadcasts its existence in the field via the same 
medium and transmits its unique identification data. The reader captures this data and decodes it 
before passing it to an application software that resides on a system other than the reader. The 
application software will then search and compare this data with the necessary information stored 
in the backend system which will typically be a database. Depending on the result produced by the 
backend system, access and/or authorization can be ensured in an RFID system. 
1.2 Security Aspects 
Due to the high vulnerability of RFID tags and the ease of identifying/tracking the RFID-
tagged objects, security and privacy form an important factor in successful deployment of the 
systems. Most of the existing RFID systems do not provide adequate security and can give away 
valuable information regarding the object/person to whom the tags belong. Passive attacks like 
tracking/identifying can be done by any adversary which are hard to detect. The most common 
attacks on an RFID system are eavesdropping on the communication channel, replay attack where 
duplicate data is sent again after some time interval, man-in-the-middle attack where an adversary 
masquerades as genuine tag/reader, loss of data/unavailability due to denial of service attack 
(DoS), forgery, hijacking and skimming as well as physical attacks like tampering with the tags.  
Addressing the security concerns invariably is difficult given the wide range of application 
scenarios in which the RFID systems may be used along with the limited resources including 
computing capabilities. Commercial market demands lower cost tags with high user functionality 
while security/privacy aspects add additional cost and hinders response times. Even if all of 
resources offered by the tag are utilized for security protocols, the traditional cryptographic 
5 
 
algorithms cannot be used to provide proper protocols in passive tags because of their limited 
resources. A higher-end passive tag can offer at most 2000 gates for security purposes whereas 
any standard cryptographic algorithm requires gates in tens of thousands [1]. In addition, the 
storage requirement of these algorithms is very high where only limited memory is offered by the 
RFID tags.  
1.3 Hash Functions 
The constrained environment, limited memory and processing capabilities thus dictate the 
cryptographic algorithm to be implemented so as to meet the necessary security standards of the 
RFID systems. Many cryptographic professionals gave considerable attention to device 
authentication and user privacy and various new protocols have been proposed. In most of these 
protocols, especially the ones designed to protect privacy of users and to hide interactions of the 
tag, it is generally assumed that a cryptographic hash function is provided on the tag and can be 
used without significant overhead on response times, memory or computational time. 
However, the hash function to be used has not been specified in reality and a general 
assumption is made that the existing hash functions with high throughput are also efficient enough 
to be implemented in constrained environments. This has been proven wrong by Feldhofer and 
Rechberger [2]. Traditional hash functions such as MD5 or SHA3 offer 256-bit security which is 
the main reason for their high memory and processing requirements. The electronic product code 
(EPC) is one type of data that can be found on RFID tags which is 96-bit long. Therefore, a security 
level of 256 bits is certainly overkill when only 96-bit data is present and in most scenarios a 
security of 80 or 64 bits sufficient. Shamir followed the same view while proposing SQUASH to 
be used in RFID systems [3]. 
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Thus, there is a need for designing hash functions that have fewer resource requirements 
than the traditional ones so that they can be deployed in a constrained environment such as an 
RFID tag. Next chapter explores one such design called the sponge construction based on which 
many hash functions have been proposed with proven security and less resource hunger. 
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Chapter 2 
Sponge Construction 
2.1 Basic concept 
The sponge construction operates on a padding rule and fixed-length 
permutation/transformation producing a function called sponge function which maps an input of 
variable length to an output of variable-length. The input to this function is a binary string of any 
length, and output is also a binary string of requested length. The sponge function is a 
generalization of fixed input length and fixed output length ciphers/hash functions. A finite state 
is present and the function operates on it with interleaved application of permutation function for 
input as well as output. 
A random oracle is a theoretical black-box which satisfies all the known security criteria 
for hash functions and no security criteria can be found anew that a random oracle does not satisfy. 
It maps an input of variable length to an output string of infinite length. This output string is purely 
random which implies that this string has bits that are uniformly distributed. The only rule of the 
random oracle is that identical inputs generate identical hash values. On the other hand, the output 
of a hash function has finite bits (n). So, an ideal hash function should represent a random oracle 
with output reduced to n bits. To find a collision, the expected number of queries to a random 
oracle is 2n/2. In order to find a (second) pre-image, the expected number of calls is 2n. A hash 
function is said to be compromised if the complexity of an attack is less than the bounds stated for 
the random oracle. 
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2.2 Construction 
The sponge construction can be imagined as a function F whose input is a fixed length 
message and whose output length can be chosen by the user as per the requirement. There is an 
internal permutation/transformation, f, of fixed-length. This function works on an internal state of 
length b-bits called the width of the sponge. The internal state is divided logically into r and c 
where c is the capacity and r is the bitrate. 
A reversible padding rule is used to pad the input message such that it is a multiple of the 
bit rate r. Then the message is divided into several blocks of r-bits. All the bits of the state are 
then initialized to some value and the sponge operates in the following phases: 
 Absorbing phase: the most significant r bits of the state are XORed with the r-bit 
input blocks sequentially, while applying the internal function f between the XOR 
Figure 2 A Sponge Construction Setup 
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operations. Once the entire input is consumed, the sponge goes to the squeezing 
phased to produce the output hash values. 
 Squeezing phase: The most significant r bits of the state are output in blocks while 
applying the function f between each squeeze. The will choose the number of 
output blocks. 
The c least significant bits of the state called the capacity are never directly operated upon 
neither by the absorption nor the squeezing phase. 
2.3 As a security reference 
A finite memory is used in any iterated function to process the message and store it. The 
state of the iterated function at any point of time can represent the input blocks received so far. 
Collisions can happen in the state as it contains a finite number of bits. Random oracles do not 
incur collisions in their internal state because such a concept of finite state does not exist. Thus, 
for functions with variable output length, a random oracle cannot be a reference to claim security 
as there are no collisions in a random oracle. 
An alternative to the random oracle model for expressing security exist which is called 
random sponge. A random sponge is a sponge construction with f chosen randomly from the set 
of transformations/permutations over b bits. Apart from the effects due to finite memory, it has 
been proven that a random sponge function is as strong as a random oracle. Thus a reference model 
has been created in the form of random sponge construction to express security claims of hash 
functions and stream ciphers. 
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If the permutation used by the sponge function can be distinguished from a randomly-
chosen function, then there is a high probability of an attack. A new design called as hermetic 
sponge strategy in which the sponge construction has a permutation f that does not show any 
properties called structural distinguishers which can be exploited and used to attack. 
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Chapter 3 
Low Cost Hash functions 
As stated above, a random sponge is as strong as a random oracle if the underlying sponge 
function is chosen randomly from the all transformation/permutation functions. Thus, various hash 
functions with proven security have been proposed based on the sponge construction and using 
different sponge functions. Two of such hardware proposals are SPONGENT and PHOTON. 
These are primarily designed to reduce the area occupied on the RFID tag so that the hardware 
footprint of these hash functions is as low as possible. 
3.1 SPONGENT 
 The construction of SPONGENT follows the same sponge construction. Initial state b=r+c 
is 0 and the input message is padded with a 1000…..0 sequence such that the size is a multiple of 
r. The input message is then divided into r-bit blocks. n is the length of the output hash value.  
The sponge construction follows the phases:  
 Initialization phase in which the message is padded by 100…..0 until it is multiple 
of r. Then the input message is divided into blocks of r-bits. 
 Absorbing phase in which the most significant r-bits of the internal state are XORed 
with the r-bit input message blocks while applying the permutation πb between the 
XOR operations. 
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 Squeezing phase in which the most significant r-bits of the state are given as output, 
with application of the permutation πb between the outputs as shown in the figure, 
until n bits are returned. This n can be chosen to be any number as required 
The permutation πb: Fb2 → Fb2 is a function that can be roughly stated as:  
for i = 1 to R do 
State ← REVERSE (lCounterb (i)) ⨁ State ⨁ lCounterb (i) 
State ← sBoxLayerb (State) 
State ← pLayerb (State) 
end for 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Sponge Construction of SPONGENT 
13 
 
 
The following are the definitions of the sbox and pbox as stated in the original work [5] 
 
1.  sBoxLayerb: This is a substitution box that operates on 4-bits and is defined as  S : F42 → 
F42. The S-box fulfills the PRESENT S-box criteria [4]. The following table describes the 
substitutions to be made in hexadecimal format 
Table 1PRESENT type SBox 
2. pLayerb: This layer moves bit j to a new bit position defined by Pb(j) as below. It is a 
slight extension of the (inverse) PRESENT bit-permutation 
𝑃𝑏(𝑗) =
{
 
 
 
  𝑗.
𝑏
4
𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑏 − 1) 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ {0,1,2, ……… . . 𝑏 − 2}
𝑏 − 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑏 − 1
 
 
3. lCounterb (i): This is a ⌈log2 R⌉-bit LFSRs. Say 𝜁 is the root of unity in the binary finite 
field, the 6-bit LFSR used in SPONGENT-88 is defined by the primitive trinomial 𝜁 6 + 𝜁 
5
 + 1 and is initialized with the value 000101. 
The following parameters are used for SPONGENT-88 which has the lowest cost. 
 Length of hash value, n = 88 
 Capacity, c = 80 
 Bit rate, r = 8 
 No. of Rounds, R = 45 
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
S[x] E B D 0 2 1 4 F 7 A 8 5 9 C 3 6 
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3.2 PHOTON 
PHOTON works in the same way as SPONGENT except that the internal permutations 
here are AES-like. This choice is particularly advantageous as we have the confidence of proven 
security of AES and all AES based hash functions while proving security of PHOTON. 
Apart from the internal permutation, PHOTON operates in the same way as any other 
sponge construction would. It consists of a t=r+c bits of internal state and n bits of output digest 
length. Absorption phase consists of dividing the m-bit input message into several r-bit blocks and 
padding with 1000….00 at the end to exact multiple of r blocks. Each r-bit block is then absorbed 
into the leftmost bits of internal state S of the sponge construction which was previously initialized 
as S0 = {0}
t-24
  || n/4 || r ||r` and the permutation function is applied on the entire state. 
Once all the r-bit blocks are absorbed, squeezing phase occurs in which, r`-bit blocks of 
data are extracted from the least significant bit positions of the state S while applying the 
permutation function in between. Thus, from [6] 
𝑆𝑖+1 = 𝑃(𝑆𝑖  ⊕ (𝑚𝑖|| {0}
𝑐 )) 
The permutation function used here is similar to that of AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard): The internal state can be thought of as a matrix of dimensions d x d where each element 
is of s bits. Therefore the total size of internal state would be d2 x s bits. Similar to AES, it has four 
stages as described below in each round and the total number of rounds being 12. 
AddConstants: 
Two constants are used in this layer. Round constants RC (v) where v is the round number 
starting from 1 is XORed with the first column of the internal state. Different internal constants 
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ICd (i) are XORed into the same first column of the internal state. The overall operations for round 
v are  S’[i; 0] = S[i; 0] ⊕ RC(v) ⊕ ICd(i) for all 0 ≤ i < d. 
RC (v) = [1; 3; 7; 14; 13; 11; 6; 12; 9; 2; 5; 10]. 
ICd (i) = [0; 1; 3; 6; 4] 
SubCells: 
An s bit substation is done at this layer to each of the cells of the internal state using the 
given Sbox. This Sbox is PRESENT type and labelled SBOXPRE [4]. The transformation function 
in this layer is  
 S’ [i; j] = SBOX(S [i; j]) for all 0 ≤ i, j < d.  
SBOXPRE = [0xc; 0x5; 0x6; 0xb; 0x9;  
0x0; 0xa; 0xd; 0x3; 0xe;  
0xf; 0x8; 0x4; 0x7; 0x1; 0x2]: 
 
Figure 4 Single Round of Permutation in PHOTON 
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ShiftRows: 
Just like the AES cipher, all the cells of every ith row are rotated to the left by i positions 
of the column. The function would be, 
 S’ [i; j] = S [i; (j + i) mod d] for all 0 ≤ i, j < d. 
MixColumns: 
This final mixing is applied to each column of the state separately. For each j input vector 
(S [0, j] . . . . , S [d – 1, j]) T representing a column, the matrix At =Serial (Z0…Zd-1). The function 
is for all 0 ≤ j < d: 
(𝑺`[𝟎, 𝒋], …………𝑺`[𝒅 − 𝟏, 𝒋])𝑻 = 𝑨𝒕
𝒅  × (𝑺[𝟎, 𝒋], …………𝑺[𝒅 − 𝟏, 𝒋])𝑻 
and At
d
 =    
1 2 9 9 2
2 5 3 8 13
13 11 10 12 1
1 15 2 3 14
14 14 8 5 12
 
The following are the parameters for the present implementation: 
 n = 88 
 r = 20 
 r’ = 16 
 s = 4 
 d = 5 
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Chapter 4 
Motivation and Present Work 
4.1 Motivation 
 The two hash functions discussed, SPONGENT and PHOTON have the lowest cost in 
terms of hardware implementations. The internal permutation/transformation function has been 
kept simple and requires less memory while simultaneously offering acceptable security levels. 
This principle of design is focused primarily to reduce the hardware footprint i.e., the gate 
equivalents (GE) required but the same can be applied when to software implementations as well. 
A simple sponge function with no additional lookup tables has to have a low footprint in 
software implementation as well. This gave us the motivation to explore the possibilities of a 
software implementation of the same hash functions and their footprint in terms of memory 
occupied, run time over different sized input etc., 
There are several advantages of a software implementation over a hardware design. 
Consider a situation where a large number of RFID tags with hardware cryptographic algorithms 
have been used in some particular application. Suppose, the present hash function has been 
compromised by generic attacks, i.e., attacks which ignore the strength of internal structure but 
concentrate on other weaknesses in the hashes. All the tags would then need another cryptographic 
algorithm that offers higher security. But as the tags themselves are hardware etched, they are 
rendered completely useless and new tags with the new hash functions are to be placed. A huge 
cost should bared to replace all the tags and is sometimes infeasible if there are large number of 
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tags or if the application is critical. Such a situation needs a software implementation of the hash 
function to provide easy updates to newer and better algorithms.  
The minimum amount of data a tag needs to hold is currently non-standardized as the scope 
of application of RFID systems is huge. This minimum data may include the unique identification 
codes, privacy policies, passwords, hash values etc. The electronic product code is currently 96-
bits long. But there is no guarantee that this length would be fixed forever. As we have witnessed 
in the case of IPv4, the 32 bit address space is used up and now IPv6 is being explored. The same 
will be the case in RFID systems but the growth will be much faster with exponential usage. 
Although the software implementation seems to be a logical choice, there are few 
disadvantages too. The hardware design offers the most compact function which can be fit in less 
than 2000 GE as evident in [5] and [6]. In addition, the software implementation adds additional 
overhead of managing bits and preprocessing.  
Thus the manufacturer must make a choice between compactness and the ability to update 
regularly both of which offers the same level of security. 
4.2 Present work 
 The above two algorithms have been implemented in the language C. A major challenge 
during the implementation was managing the bits. C does not offer manipulation of individual bits. 
There are third party libraries that do manage individual bits but in a redundant way which will 
further dump addition overhead on the program.  
 Declaring an integer variable for each bit would remove the overhead of managing bits but 
would increase the memory required. There is a tradeoff between memory and processing 
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overhead. As the implementation is intended for constrained devices, memory is of highest value. 
Compromising on the storage area defeats the whole purpose of low cost implementations. 
Therefore, a choice has been made to manage the individual bits while reducing the storage 
requirements to as low as possible. 
 The size of the smallest data type that can be used in C is 8 bits for a char type. The 
permutation of the discussed hash constructions operate on 4-bits. Hence, a structure has been used 
that contains a char type out of which only 4 bits will be used for all operations of the internal 
permutation. To ensure only 4 bits shall be used, the structure is declared in the form: 
 struct element { 
unsigned char val : 4; 
}; 
Another viable option to save memory is to use all the 8 bits of the char data type and 
manage the bits according to which bits form the least significant part and which form the most 
significant part. This choice has been explored and it was found that the program becomes too 
complex to operate in real time.  
The slight wastage incurred by using only 4 bits out of the 8 available bits of the char type 
was simple. Hence, the choice. 
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4.2.1 Algorithms 
SPONGENT  
Pad the input M with 1000….001 such that it is a multiple of r 
State = [0000….00] 
1. for each block of r-bit sized input (mi) do 
2.        State = State ⊕ mi 
3.        for i = 1 to R do 
4.               state ← (reverse (lCounterb(i)))⊕ state ⊕ lCounterb(i) 
5.               state ← sBoxLayerb(state) 
6.               state ← pLayerb(state) 
7.        end for 
8. end for 
 
9. for each block of desired output (n-bits/r-bits): 
10.   output r-bits from state 
11.   for i = 1 to R do 
12.    state ← (reverse (lCounterb(i))) ⊕ state ⊕ lCounterb(i) 
13.    state ← sBoxLayerb(state) 
14.    state ← pLayerb(state) 
15.    end for 
16. end for 
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PHOTON 
/* S is the internal state represented by a dxd matrix of t bits total size with s bits at * 
each cell*/ 
PHOTON: 
1. For each block of r-bit input: 
2.   Absorb(mi,S) 
3.   Permute(S) 
4. End 
5. For each block of r`-bit output required: 
6.   Squeeze(S) 
7.   Permute(S) 
8. End 
Absorb: 
9.   S = S ^ mi 
Squeeze: 
10.  Print r` bits from S 
Permute 
11.   For i = 0 to Nr: 
12.    AddConstants() 
13.    SubCells() 
14.    ShiftRows() 
15.    MixColumns() 
16.   End 
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Chapter 5 
Results and Analysis 
5.1 Results 
 The hash values of the following messages have been calculated using both the functions 
and the results are as shown in the screen shots below. The programs are run on a 2.67 GHz Intel 
core i5 processor using GNU GCC compiler. 
Messages: 
1. 96 bit messages 
a. “NIT ROURKELA” 
b. “NIT ROURKFLA” 
c. “NIT RPURKFLA” 
d. “NIT SPURKFLA” 
2. 304 bit message 
3. 7808 bit message 
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5.1.1 Hash function SPONGENT 
1. 96 bit message 
 
 
Figure 5 SPONGENT hash values for 96 bit messages 
2. 304 bit message 
 
 
Figure 6 SPONGENT hash value for 304 bit message 
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3. 7808 bit message 
 
 
5.1.2 Hash function PHOTON 
1. 96 bit messages 
 
Figure 7 SPONGENT hash value of 7808 bit message 
Figure 8 PHOTON hash values for 96 bit messages 
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2. 304 bit message 
 
3. 7808 bit message 
 
 
Figure 9 PHOTON hash value for 304 bit message 
Figure 10 PHOTON hash value for 7808 bit message 
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5.2 Analysis 
The following are the results of the analysis performed on both of the implementations 
using same bit messages to encrypt. 
Table 2 A comparison of the software implementations 
PARAMETERS SPONGENT PHOTON 
Memory 5014 4136 
Runtime for general use 
case (96 bits) 
0.003132 0.001986 
Cycles/Byte 25.38 19.53 
 
Cycles/Byte measures the number of cycles the CPU has spent to process one byte of data. It 
is calculated using the following formula 
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒 =  
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑
𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑
 
Cycles are the CPU instruction cycles. Thus Cycles per second is the clock speed of the 
processor. Bytes per second is the number of Bytes processed by the algorithm in one second. 
27 
 
Bytes per second is calculated by running the programs N times over B byte input messages and 
calculating the time taken, E for the entire operation. Thus bytes per second will be N*B/E. 
As the result suggests, SPONGENT needs more cycles to process one byte of data than 
PHOTON. This is reverse of what the hardware analysis done by [5] and [6] suggests. SPONGENT 
occupies only 728 GE where PHOTON occupies more than 1120 GE.  
 
Figure 11 Bytes vs Runtime of PHOTON and SPONGENT 
 
 The above graph clearly confirms the fact that on a minute scale, PHOTON outperforms 
SPONGENT. This difference seems insignificant due to the optimizations by the processor on 
which the programs are run. This difference will be more hard pressed if the size of input message 
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increases and/or if the program is deployed in a constrained environment where the processing 
capability and buffer space are limited.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and future work 
Although SPONGENT has the lowest hardware footprint according to its implementers 
[5], its software cost is higher than PHOTON. In the hardware implementations PHOTON 
occupied approximately 1120 GE [6] whereas SPONGENT required 728 GE [5] only. But the size 
and runtime of SPONGENT is greater than PHOTON and thus, in a software implementation of 
hash functions PHOTON is a better choice. Other analysis including the variation of runtime with 
message size further proves that software implementations behave differently than that of 
hardware designs and a careful analysis has to be carried out before making a choice. 
The programs are implemented in language C and compiled using a GNU GCC compiler. 
Execution of the programs is done on an Intel Core i5 processor with clock speed of 2.67 GHz. 
This does not represent even closely the constrained environments in which the programs are to 
be deployed but a measure of Cycles/Byte gives us an approximate metric independent of 
processors. PHOTON again proves that it is a better choice independent of the underlying 
hardware. 
The sponge construction is a promising design which can offer high levels of security while 
leaving the overhead and complexity involved in block ciphers. New hash functions can be 
proposed using the same sponge construction and different internal permutations. The security of 
the new proposals can also be proved with proper research. The process of proving that 
cryptographic algorithm is completely secure and safe to use takes several years and hundreds of 
30 
 
cryptographers. Thus, new proposals and analysis of their security has been left for future work 
involving a lot of research. 
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